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1 Wojciech Giełżyński, “Wiwat Konstytucja! Niech nas uczy nadal,” Tygodnik Solidarność (Warsaw, 
Poland), May 3-10, 1991. 
 Since its adoption in 1791, the Ustawa rządowa (Government Act) of the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth, colloquially referred to as the Konstytucja 3 Maja (Constitution of 3 
May), has been at the epicenter of debate. Just as with similar paramount legislation, the 
intentions and interpretation of the document have been in question since its conception. This 
phenomenon was especially present within the Polish context because, for most of its history 
following the adoption of this Constitution, Poland did not exist as an independent and sovereign 
nation. The largest contributing factor to the historic memory surrounding the May 3rd 
Constitution can be attributed to the subsequent partitions and foreign occupations of Poland, 
which suppressed, and in some cases actively banned, celebrations of the Constitution.2 This 
interdiction guaranteed that, with every passing anniversary of May 3rd, the Constitution was 
elevated to an almost martyr-like status. Therefore, the vision of Poland the Constitution 
promised has not only been repeatedly interpreted throughout Polish history, but has arguably 
become representative of a mysticized, unattainable ideal.  
This paper will explore the May 3rd Constitution, and what it represented to the Polish 
people, in 1991—the bicentennial of its inauguration. 1991, however, represents much more than 
just the two-hundred-year anniversary of the Constitution. Only five months earlier on December 
22nd, Lech Wałęsa, co-founder and leader of Solidarność (Solidarity), the first non-Communist 
labor union in the Eastern bloc, was sworn into the office of President of Poland—an event many 
consider the formal end of the Communist People’s Republic of Poland (PRL), and the 
                                               
2 The second and third partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, both of which can be partially 
attributed to the ratification of the May 3rd Constitution, helped the Commonwealth’s nobility and 
intelligentsia formulate an identity and narrative of Polish martyrdom. This narrative was further 
propagated by the rise of nationalistic sentiment in Europe in the nineteenth century, and cultural 
touchstones like the May 3rd Constitution served to construct a very specific idea of what the Polish nation 
was. For an excellent read regarding this process and its effects today, refer to Gerhard Wagner, 
“Nationalism and Cultural Memory in Poland: The European Union Turns East,” International Journal of 
Politics, Culture, and Society 17, no. 2 (2003): 191-212, accessed March 22, 2018, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20007675. 
beginning of today’s Republic of Poland. 1991 was therefore a crucial year in Poland’s post-
communist development. Because the bicentennial of the Constitution was occurring 
simultaneously with this development, many influential figures began employing the document 
to further their own vision of a post-communist Poland. By analyzing articles regarding the May 
3rd Constitution from three contemporary prominent Polish newspapers, each representing a 
different segment of Polish political ideology (Christian democratic, left-wing, and centrist), this 
paper will demonstrate how, by 1991, the Constitution symbolized a venerable Polish tradition, 
and how the rhetoric of this tradition was used during this pivotal stage of post-Communist 
development. 
Background 
 The Constitution of 3 May was drafted as a means to save the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth—not only from foreign forces, but from the Commonwealth itself. During the 
Polish Golden Age, the Commonwealth became one of the largest and most powerful kingdoms 
in Europe, boasting a unique system of government in which all the szlachta (nobles) shared 
equal status with one another, and enjoyed a myriad of privileges and rights that did not extend 
to the general populous. This system of privileges, known as the Złote wolności (Golden 
Liberties), effectively allowed the szlachta to control the Sejm (parliament), as well as the 
Commonwealth’s elected king, who was required under the Pacta conventa to respect and 
uphold all of these Golden Liberties. Most important, however, was the parliamentary device 
known as the liberum veto, which empowered any member of the Sejm to forcefully end any 
session of the parliament, or to nullify any piece of legislation that may have passed in that 
session.3 The use of the liberum veto, which was intended to assure democracy within the ruling 
elite, became much more liberal in the 18th century, when foreign powers bribed petty szlachta 
into halting parliamentary proceedings.   
 The abuse of the liberum veto along with the other Golden Liberties eventually weakened 
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and the culmination of the Sejm’s ineffectiveness and 
corruption was the First Partition in 1772, through which the Kingdom of Prussia and the 
Russian and Habsburg Austrian Empires seized about half of the Commonwealth’s population 
and around 30% of its territory.4 It is in the wake of this foreign invasion that the Sejm Wielki 
(Great Sejm) assembled in Warsaw between 1788 and 1792, hoping to reform the political and 
economic systems of the Commonwealth, in the hopes of eventually regaining sovereignty. It 
was in this Sejm that the Ustawa rządowa was drafted, and eventually adopted on May 3rd.5 The 
Constitution was the first of its kind in Europe, and the second in the world (the United States of 
America ratified their constitution a mere two years earlier). The Constitution introduced 
unprecedented reforms - religious tolerance (Article I), certain freedoms for townspeople (Article 
III), protections for the peasantry (Article IV) and abolishing the liberum veto (Article VI).6 
However, not all members of the Great Sejm were receptive to such liberal reforms. The 
                                               
3 For further information regarding the complex, and in many ways, unique political system of the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth, see Kazimierz Baran, “Procedure in Polish-Lithuanian parliaments from 
the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries,” Parliaments, Estates & Representation 22, no.1 (2002): 57-69, 
accessed October 22, 2017, https://doi.org/10.1080/02606755.2002.9522143. 
4 Encyclopedia Britannica Online, s.v. “Partitions of Poland,” accessed March 14, 2018, 
https://www.britannica.com/event/Partitions-of-Poland. 
5 The Great Sejm, sometimes referred to as the Four-Year Sejm, accomplished this feat by establishing 
itself as a konfederacja (confederation), which had different parliamentary procedure than that of a 
regular Sejm. The most pressing of these differences was that a confederation could not employ the 
liberum veto; legislation was passed by a majority vote. For further reading on the Great Sejm, and the 
contemporary political climate that led to, and followed, the Great Sejm refer to Richard Butterwick, 
“Political Discourses of the Polish Revolution, 1788-92,” The English Historical Review 120, no. 487 
(2005): 695-731, accessed October 25, 2017, http://www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/stable/3489412. 
6 New constitution of the government of Poland, trans. for J. Debrett (London, England: Burlington House 
of London, 1791), 5-6, 9, 9-12, 18. 
Constitution itself was passed by the pro-reformers in secret, while the dissidents were away on 
Easter recess. 
 Dissidents of the Constitution did not take lightly to this underhanded maneuver. This 
group did not agree with the Constitutional reforms on a fundamental level—they feared that the 
document would strip them of their Golden Freedoms, significantly reducing their power and 
influence. Their biggest concern was the fact that the Constitution abolished the system of 
elective monarchy by instating a hereditary monarchy in its place.7 In response, the 
Constitution’s opponents enlisted in the help of Catherine II of Russia and formed the 
Konfederacja Targowicka (Targowica Confederation), in hopes of overthrowing the Constitution 
and restoring the old system. The Founding Act of the Targowica Confederation shows how 
deeply betrayed and concerned the members of the confederation were: 
We… recognize that the Republic is no longer ours, that today’s parliament [...] has 
broken all fundamental laws, swept away all liberties of the gentry and on the third of 
May 1971 turned into a revolution and a conspiracy. Its new form of government, 
established by the bourgeois, ulans, and soldiers, has dictated new laws of succession to 
the throne, freed the king from the obligation of taking an oath of pacta conventa, 
extended royal powers, and turned the Republic into a monarchy. It has robbed the gentry 
without possessions of its equality and liberty.8 
 
From this document, it is apparent that the members of the Targowica Confederation saw the 
Constitution as violating a sacred tradition that ruled the Commonwealth for centuries. The 
                                               
7 Many nobles were willing to reform the contemporary political system, acknowledging its many faults 
and shortcomings. However, these nobles were also accustomed to the system of Golden Liberties, 
which allowed even the pettiest and poorest of nobles some semblance of power. Although not as 
explicitly, many dissidents were also worried about their status in relation to the status of serfs, which 
made up over 90% of the population in the Commonwealth. The existence of serfdom to such a large 
extent in the Commonwealth assured that any reforms regarding this institution would be met with 
opposition from nobles; see Jerome Blum, “The Rise of Serfdom in Eastern Europe,” The American 
Historical Review 63, no. 4 (1957), accessed September 27, 2017, 
http://www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/stable/1845515. For further reading regarding arguments for and 
against the May 3rd Constitution, refer to the following anthology of contemporary documents – Anna, 
Grześkowiak-Krwawicz, Za czy przeciw ustawie rządowej : walka publicystyczna o Konstytucję 3 Maja 
(Polska Akademia Nauk, Instytut Badań Literackich, 1992). 
8 Balázs Trencsényi and Michal Kopeček, Late Enlightenment: Emergence of the Modern 'National Idea' 
(Budapest, Hungary: Central European University Press, 2006), 284. 
Confederation was their attempt at regaining this tradition, which they perceived as being 
threatened by the Constitution. Unfortunately for them, not only did their plan ultimately fail—it 
led to the Second Partition of Poland (and later, the Third Partition). The May 3rd Constitution, 
therefore, would remain an idealized piece of legislation, and nothing more, for the next two 
hundred years. 
Gazeta Wyborcza 
 The first issue of Gazeta Wyborcza (Electoral Newspaper) was published May 8th, 1989. 
Since its founding, the editor-in-chief has been Adam Michnik - an intellectual dissident of the 
communist party since the 1960s, and a prominent member of the Komitet Obrony Robotników 
(Workers’ Defense Committee). The newspaper assumes a center-left tone.9 Compared to 
Tygodnik Solidarność and Polityka, Gazeta Wyborcza offered the most comprehensive 
commentary of May 3rd, covering topics such as May 3rd celebrations around the world, an 
analysis of Jan Matejko’s famous May 3rd painting, and criticisms of contemporary Polish 
society.10 
A Source of Communist Opposition 
 One of the featured articles in the May 4th issue of Gazeta Wyborcza was an assessment 
by historian and sociologist Marcin Kula, entitled “Dlaczego Polacy dziś cenią Konstytucję 3 
Maja” (“Why Poles today value the May 3rd Constitution”). In his article, Kula explores why, in 
his opinion, the Constitution is still relevant to, and present in, Polish conscientiousness. One of 
                                               
9 “The press in Poland,” BBC News, April 29, 2014, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3669427.stm. 
10 “3 maja na świecie,” Gazeta Wyborcza (Warsaw, Poland), May 4-5, 1991; “Kto jest kim na obrazie 
Matejki,” Gazeta Wyborcza (Warsaw, Poland), May 2-3, 1991; Bronisław Geremek, “Czy nie pozostanie 
nic z zapału i solidarności,” Gazeta Wyborcza (Warsaw, Poland), May 6, 1991. Hereafter abbreviated 
“Czy nie pozostanie”. 
his first arguments is that because of its date, the celebration of May 3rd was an active protest 
against communism. This is because the holiday falls right after May 1st, International Workers’ 
Day, which was commemorated through state-sponsored parades and celebrations in the Eastern 
Bloc. “The date of May 3rd, however, already became a symbol of opposition very early on…” 
Kula writes, “It stuck, however, strongly enough to appear as an active symbol in the decisive 
phase of the contestation of communism.”11 The historian, therefore, sees the observance of May 
3rd as the antithesis of the Communist-sponsored May 1st celebrations. By positing Polish 
resistance against the Communist authority, Kula is effectively playing on contemporary 
negative predispositions towards the Communist party, while redefining and elevating the 
importance of the Constitution in Polish culture.  
Furthermore, Kula explicitly redefines the Constitution in terms of Polish tradition, by 
drawing connections between it and the Solidarity movement:  
In the seventies, Wałęsa stuck the Crowned Eagle and signs saying “the May 3rd 
Constitution” on the glass of his dilapidated car, and served 48 hours multiple times for 
distributing leaflets reminding of this anniversary… His usage of any element of 
traditional symbolism in the protest of the workers’ movement was unimaginable, 
because it was the symbolism of the very system against which he fought.12 
 
The usage of this anecdote is twofold. First, by tying the Constitution to the popular workers’ 
movement, Kula is once again playing on Polish anti-Communist sympathies.13 Additionally, he 
                                               
11 Marcin Kula, “Dlaczego Polacy dziś cenią Konstytucję 3 Maja,” Gazeta Wyborcza (Warsaw, Poland), 
May 4, 1991. Hereafter abbreviated “Dlaczego Polacy”. 
12 Kula, “Dlaczego Polacy”. 
13 A vehement anti-Communist worldview, which is still present in Poland today, directly followed the end 
of Communism in the nation. Anti-Communist rhetoric has shaped the Polish national narrative in almost 
every way—from politics, to economics, to social interactions. Even the official name of the Polish nation-
state plays on anti-Communist sympathies. Today, the nation is referred to as the Third Republic, 
implying that it is a direct descendant of the First Republic (Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) and the 
Second Republic (which existed in the interwar period). However, this move also serves to erase the 
legitimacy of the Polish Communist state (PRL), insinuating that the PRL itself has no claim to Polishness. 
For a more comprehensive look at this phenomenon and its effects, see Tomasz Kamusella, The Un-
Polish Poland, 1989 and the Illusion of Regained Historical Continuity (Basingstoke, United Kingdom: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). 
manages to illustrate the difference between the appropriated Polish tradition as used by “the 
system”, and the reclaimed ‘true’ Polish tradition as used by Wałęsa. 
 Kula draws even further from the tradition of the May 3rd Constitution by envisioning the 
version of Poland he believes the Constitution and its authors offered, drawing direct 
comparisons between Poland in the eighties and Poland in the late eighteenth century.  
The fourth factor in the popularity of this Constitution - and one can actually say this 
about the entire work of the Four-Year Sejm - resulted from the tendency to modernize, 
whose carrier was the movement of the eighties… The May 3rd Constitution posited itself 
as a good example of modernization measures. Her creators also wanted for a decaying 
and backwards country to stand on its feet and catch up with the contemporary European 
standards. These were, in my opinion, the circumstances determining the popularity of 
the May 3rd Constitution in Poland in the eighties.14 
 
Kula is therefore explicitly drawing a distinct line between the modernization process of late-
eighteenth century Poland and the one in late-twentieth century Poland. By drawing this line, he 
argues that the history and tradition of Poland is one of modernization and innovation, implying 
that Poland has been chasing this ideal since 1791. Furthermore, by drawing parallels between 
the state of affairs in 1791 with the state of affairs in 1991, especially through the juxtaposition 
of the “decaying and backwards” Poland then and now, Kula is utilizing a very vivid metaphor, 
well-known to all Poles. His implicit message is there—this time around, Poland must be willing 
to modernize and reform, or yet again face devastating consequences that would threaten its 
existence. 
 However, it is important to note that Kula is not using his platform simply to argue that 
the Constitution is the culmination of Polish tradition, and should be treated as that: 
However, when I think of [the President’s] official function and the operation of the state, 
I’m afraid, I admit, of this pressure of faith and tradition… I would like for us to create a 
non-conservative, religious Ireland… but an enlightened state, respecting tradition, but 
                                               
14 Kula, “Dlaczego Polacy”. 
open to the world… just like the creators of the May 3rd Constitution desired, according 
to the criteria of their time, who are themselves tied to religion and Polish tradition.15 
 
In the conclusion of his article, Kula expresses his concern regarding what he previously refers to 
as “a closure in one’s own tradition, religion and customs”.16 He believes that while a return to 
tradition is cathartic and necessary, it has to be done so carefully, so as to continue this trend of 
modernization. In essence, to Kula, Polish tradition is not the culmination of Roman-Catholicism 
and folk customs, but a more abstract tendency towards progress and reform. Because Kula also 
witnesses the trend towards modernization in the eighties, during which the Constitution was 
adopted as a symbol of opposition to Communism, the historian views this tradition to be an 
apparent fact, and one that is inherent in Polish consciousness. 
A Uniting Factor 
Another interesting article found in Gazeta Wyborcza is an excerpt from a speech given 
by Member of Parliament Bronisław Geremek during a Sejm session on May 3rd. At the time, 
Geremek was one of the leaders of the Unia Demokratyczna (Democratic Union), a centrist, 
Christian-democratic party. His speech, “Czy nie pozostanie nic z zapału i solidarności” (“Will 
nothing remain from enthusiasm and solidarity”), reveals the politician’s own interpretation of 
what the Constitution means to Poland—and specifically, to Polish society. Another article in the 
same issue, “3 Maja” (“May 3rd”), commends the speech, claiming that, “Bronisław Geremek, 
chairman of the parliamentary Constitutional Committee, in a warmly applauded speech, 
compared the chances of Poland today with the moment of the Constitution’s adoption.”17 
Geremek’s main concern appears to be the estrangement of Polish society, which until 
recently, was a model of unification. “The last such moments of unification and community were 
                                               
15 Kula, “Dlaczego Polacy”. 
16 Kula, “Dlaczego Polacy”. 
17 “3 Maja,” Gazeta Wyborcza (Warsaw, Poland), May 4-5, 1991. 
experienced by the vast majority of our nation two years ago,” he laments.18 Geremek finds it 
necessary to keep the momentum of Solidarity going in order to create a Polish nation that 
achieves its full potential. In fact, he finds that the memory of the 3rd of May requires such 
cooperation, to properly commemorate “the joyful day, whose fruits, of course, did not have time 
to ripen yet.”19 
Like Kula, Geremek believes that the May 3rd Constitution is part of the Polish tradition 
and explicitly draws a connection between contemporary Poland and the Poland of two hundred 
years ago. However, unlike Kula, the politician appears to see this tradition at face-value— “200 
years ago, Poland was at the forefront of building a nation of freedom and law, in the vein of 
modern political thought. By declaring an attachment to this tradition, we have the right today - 
amid distress, concern and embarrassment - to pride. To raise our heads.”20 Geremek appears to 
believe that the Constitution’s main influence on Polish society is as a unifying force—a 
common touchstone upon which Polish people can situate themselves not only within their own 
nation, but in a broader European context. 
This type of interpretation differs slightly from Kula’s, who argues that the Constitution 
of 3 May is a living document, but not by much. While Geremek allocates less power to the 
Constitution, arguing that the document serves as an example of what happens when Poles work 
together for the common good, an instance “when Poles were able to rise above personal 
ambitions and group interests, attesting to the truth that the good of the Republic is timeless”, 
both he and Kula appear to commend the Constitution’s progressive message, and what the 
document represents to Poland today.21 To Geremek, the document illustrates a Polish tradition 
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19 Geremek, “Czy nie pozostanie”. 
20 Geremek, “Czy nie pozostanie”. 
21 Geremek, “Czy nie pozostanie”. 
not contained within the actual Acts and stipulations of the Constitution, but in the process 
behind it. This means that, whereas Kula draws upon the Constitution’s ideology as an 
explanation of its popularity, Geremek’s understanding of it draws upon a parallel between the 
actual Solidarity movement and the Great Sejm. To him, the Polish tradition is one of action in 
the face of hardship—the Great Sejm took action by assembling in 1788 to pen the Constitution 
in response to the First Partition, while Solidarity took action by forming in 1980 to resist the 
ruling communist party. This perception of the Constitution implies that this tradition is passed 
down from generation to generation, and is not only cemented in national consciousness, but 
enforced by the very framework that establishes the nation. 
Nationalistic Foreboding? 
 There are a number of smaller, more concise articles dealing with the May 3rd 
Constitution in Gazeta Wyborcza. Most of these focus on celebrations in the nation, as well as in 
the Polish communities from around the world. Additionally, there is another featured article, 
“Kto jest kim na obrazie Matejki” (“Who is who in Matejko’s painting”) that identifies key 
figures in Jan Matejko’s Konstytucja 3 Maja 1791 roku, and briefly discusses their relevance to 
the story of how the Constitution came into existence. Interestingly enough, this article, as well 
as a short report on Polish celebrations of the holiday, “Koncerty, defilady” (“Concerts, 
parades”), reveal another tie between the Constitution and Polish tradition - nationalism. 
 After detailing many joyous and colorful celebrations of May 3rd from different parts of 
Poland, the “Koncerty, defilady” article proceeded with the following account:  
“Poland for Poles”, “Buy Polish goods”, “Deutsche Schweine” - were the chants during 
demonstrations of the Stronnictwo Narodowe (National Party) on May 3rd in Opole. 120 
participants of the demonstrations - around 100 of which were skinheads - marched from 
the railway station to the monument to the Fighters for Silesian Opole Freedom, where 
representatives of the National Party were speaking. Leaflets with the lyrics to “Rota” 
along with the inscription “Today the unification of Germany - tomorrow, the V partition 
of Poland” were distributed. After the demonstration, the skinheads chanted "Jude raus" 
and "Deutsche Schweine". There were no incidents, and the police did not intervene.22 
 
The National Party was a political party that was revived in 1989. The party's ideology borrowed 
heavily from that of the Endecja (National Democracy), a political movement active from 1886 
and 1947. The movement was infamous for its right-wing Polish nationalism and its anti-
Semitism.23 The very existence of the National Party, as well as demonstrations such as the one 
described, showcase a very different type of tradition, but one that is Polish nonetheless - a 
tradition of nationalism and anti-Semitism. 
One can also see allusions to this tradition in the “Kto jest kim na obrazie Matejki” 
article. The author draws heavily on the interpretations of art historian Jarosław Krawczyk, 
incorporating Krawczyk’s own conclusions into his article. One of these conclusions regards the 
“symbolic figures” included in Matejko’s work, and in particular, the identity of a bearded 
character depicted in bottom right corner of the painting. Krawczyk believes that these figures 
are Jewish people, “the representative of dark forces; his satisfaction of what happens before the 
collegiate does not bode well”.24 Krawczyk’s own conclusions are based on the fact that the 
famous painter was an outspoken anti-Semite who, “could not abide Jews, claiming that they 
constituted the most harmful race in the world.”25 The Jewish people in his works are often 
portrayed in a negative and prejudiced way; Professor Ezra Mendelsohn notes that in the artist’s 
                                               
22 “Koncerty, defilady,” Gazeta Wyborcza (Warsaw, Poland), May 4-5, 1991. 
23 The National Democracy party was founded by Roman Dmowski during a period in which nationalist 
sentiments were on the rise in Europe, particularly in Eastern Europe. Its original intent was to fight for 
partitioned Poland’s sovereignty by uniting all Poles to rally for their freedom. However, the party’s narrow 
definition of a Pole - Polish speaking, Roman-Catholic – ultimately precluded many potential allies from 
joining its ranks. The party, in turn, allied itself with the Church and turned towards hateful anti-Semitic 
rhetoric to explain its lack of popularity. While the National Democracy party officially dissolved in 1947, 
many political parties in Poland today draw upon its traditions and legacy. 
24 “Kto jest kim na obrazie Matejki,” Gazeta Wyborcza (Warsaw, Poland), May 2-3, 1991.  
25  Marian Gorzkowski, Jan Matejko. Epoka od r. 1861 do konca życia artysty (Cracow: Towarzystwo 
Przyjaciół Sztuk Pięknych w Krakowie, 1993), 371. 
rendition of Przyjęcie Żydów do Polski w. r. 1096 (The Reception of the Jews in Poland in 1096), 
the Jewish people “are depicted as a wild band of alien, grotesque, gesticulating men, women 
and children, totally different in every way from the calm Poles considering whether or not to 
admit them.”26 Matejko clearly had no qualms in spreading anti-Semitic rhetoric through his 
works, explicitly characterizing Jewish people as “other”, juxtaposing the “villainous Jews” 
against important moments of Polish history. 
For these reasons, the art historian concludes that by including Jews in his work, Matejko 
“ties a critical thread against the Constitution, which - so to speak - is defined as an act 
disappointing the peasant, and satisfying the Jew.”27 By including an interpretation that draws 
heavily on Matejko’s antisemitism, the author of the article paints a dark and conspiratorial view 
regarding the Constitution; harkening back to old-school Polish anti-Semitism, which posited the 
poor peasant against the rich Jew, who profited from the peasant’s oppression.28 
Both these articles, although differing in their subject matter, explicitly tie May 3rd with a 
tradition of nationalism and anti-Semitism. By choosing to stage their nationalist demonstration 
on May 3rd, the National Party is sending a candid message of who the holiday truly belongs to, 
                                               
26 Ezra Mendelsohn, “Art and Jewish–Polish Relations: Matejko and Gottlieb at the National Museum in 
Warsaw,” Jewish Studies at the Central European University (2000): 7. 
27 “Kto jest kim na obrazie Matejki,” Gazeta Wyborcza (Warsaw, Poland), May 2-3, 1991. 
28 The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had, at one point, the largest population of Jewish people in the 
world. Because of the religious, cultural and ethnic diversity of the Commonwealth, groups of people often 
coexisted (although not always harmoniously), comingled, and thrived. However, as already noted, an 
overwhelming majority of these people were enserfed peasants. While Jewish people did not constitute 
this population, they interacted with the Commonwealth’s peasants on a daily basis, often serving as 
noblemen’s accountants, or innkeepers. Jewish people were also heavily pressured to enforce 
Propination laws (which dictated that noble landowners had monopoly over the profits from alcohol that 
was drunk by their serfs), as tavern keeping was the one of the only positions open to Jews. Propination 
laws caused a massive rise of alcoholism in Poland and led serfs (as well as anti-Semitic reformers and 
intelligentsia) to blame the Jewish people for actively harming and corrupting the former; asserting that 
the Jew was getting richer by exploiting the peasant. For more information regarding Propination laws 
and how they directly correlated with anti-Semitism, see Hillel Levine, “Gentry, Jews, and Serfs: The Rise 
of Polish Vodka,” Review (Fernand Braudel Center) 4, no. 2 (1980): 223-250, accessed October 11, 
2017, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40240865.  
and their definition of Pole is an explicitly anti-German, anti-Semitic one. The author of the “Kto 
jest kim na obrazie Matejki” is effectively doing the same, by implying that anti-Semitism was, 
and is, present at national symbols commemorating Polish freedom and precedent. These two 
articles, therefore, show yet another dimension of Polish tradition—a nationalistic one that “gate-
keeps” Polish identity and culture. This sort of rhetoric, which reveals itself in times of 
uncertainty and change, allows for those who believe in it to situate themselves in an “us” versus 
“them” binary, thus enforcing and perpetuating the negative realities of nationalism which have 
existed in Poland for centuries. 
Tygodnik Solidarność 
 Tygodnik Solidarność (Solidarity Weekly) was first published in 1981 by the Solidarity 
movement. It was the official press organ of the labor union, and quickly shut down after the 
imposition of martial law that very same year.29 The weekly periodical covers socio-political and 
economic topics, with a heavy focus on the union, and assumes a Christian-democratic tone. 
Similarly to Gazeta Wyborcza, the newspaper had very heavy coverage of May 3rd and related 
events. Tygodnik Solidarność, however, assumes a very different tone and interpretation of the 
Constitution, as it very distinctly sees everything from a Solidarity angle. While this very limited 
view has its faults, it does allow a modern audience some insight into the union’s early ideology 
and politics. This is particularly useful as the newspaper is celebrating its own 10-year 
anniversary, and by using the rhetoric of the May 3rd Constitution, it is essentially situating itself 
in the grand scheme of Polish history and tradition - making its own relatively short run seem 
more expansive and comprehensive. 
                                               
29 Tomasz Mielczarek, “On contemporary conservative opinion weeklies,” Media i Społeczeństwo 6, 
(2016): 150. 
 Furthermore, an analysis of the 1991 editions of Tygodnik Solidarność reveals an 
interesting trend. Over the years, the newspaper has gained a reputation for being extremely 
conservative, and in 2018, Tygodnik Solidarność is very vocal in its support of the current radical 
right-wing government in power. However, it appears that the newspaper had not yet assumed 
this tone in 1991. The front-page headline was written by Wojciech Giełżyński, a prominent 
leftist at the time, who was actively involved in resurrecting the democratic-socialist Polska 
Partia Socjalistyczna (Polish Socialist Party) and founding the Unia Pracy (Labour Union) 
party, which was also progressive and socially democratic in nature.30 Furthermore, whereas the 
newspaper today relies heavily on conservative Catholic rhetoric that actively renounces atheism 
and ideologia gender (“ideology of gender”), back in 1991 it still appeared to retain a tone of 
ecumenicism that was so prominent in the Solidarity movement of the 80s.31 This sort of 
comparison is especially interesting in analyzing the newspaper’s positions, what traditions it is 
drawing upon, and how these positions changed over years. It is clear that, while in the nineties, 
Tygodnik Solidarność was validating its existence by drawing on the legacy of the May 3rd 
Constitution, it has since shifted towards a different source for legitimizing itself. 
Solidarity as the Successor of the Great Sejm 
                                               
30 The Polish Socialist Party (PSP), which was in its prime from 1892 to 1948, is one of Poland’s most 
important political parties. It was both socialist and nationalist in nature, and like Dmowski’s National 
Democratic party, advocated for Polish sovereignty. However, unlike the National Democratic party, it did 
not envision a homogenous, Polish-speaking, Roman-Catholic nation; rather, the leaders of the party 
wanted to recreate the religiously-tolerant, multi-ethnic Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Also, unlike the 
National Democratic party, the PSP enjoyed more support and membership. The party was dissolved into 
Poland’s governing Communist party Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza (Polish United Worker’s 
Party) in 1948. 
31 The “ideology of gender” is an extremely complex and encompassing Christian conservative view in 
Poland. The ideology has roots in Catholic sex ethics, genderism (the belief that gender is a binary), 
homophobia, transphobia and sexism. However, the word is so loosely used that it has also been seen 
describing “pedophilia, incest, sexualisation of children, totalitarianism, abortion and euthanasia”. For an 
excellent source on the definition of the “ideology of gender”, and its rise in Poland, see Anna Jawor, “A 
Moral Panic Towards Transforming Sexual Norms in Poland,” International Journal of Arts & Sciences 8, 
no. 8 (2015): 183-194, accessed April 14, 2017, http://proxy.lib.umich.edu/login?url=https://search-
proquest-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/1769895784?accountid=14667.  
The May 3rd issue of Tygodnik Solidarność headlines with a banner exclaiming “Wiwat 
Konstytucja! Niech nas uczy nadal” (“Long live the Constitution! May it keep teaching us”). The 
accompanying article makes very explicit comparisons between Solidarity and the Great Sejm - 
even going as far as comparing prominent figures from the eighties to certain members of that 
Sejm. The author, Wojciech Giełżyński, begins by claiming that, “The May 3rd Constitution was 
the rebirth of a nation of rot, a nation in decay and hopeless apathy. Solidarity was too.”32 There 
is no doubt over Giełżyński’s stance on the May 3rd events—a stance he makes even clearer in a 
following passage in which he maintains that both movements gained approval and support from 
the West because of their progressiveness.  
 Giełżyński’s claim that Solidarity is a direct descendant of the Great Sejm becomes even 
more straightforward later in his article: 
Let's… dispel the naive idyllic myth that "the whole nation" shouted: "Long live the 
king! Long live the Sejm! Long live all states!”... Rapid revolutions are dangerous - 
[Stanisław August] wrote on the margins of the Ignacy Potocki’s projects (the Kuroń of 
his day), because he was afraid of the tsarist, brutal like Brezhnev, and native magnate 
block. In other words, Stanisław August’s camp behaved like the party reformers in the 
end of the Gierek years, affiliated with the "Experience and Future" Conversatorium, who 
also deluded themselves that the system could be reformed by the method of small steps - 
but then they followed Solidarity in a nationwide rush.33 
 
By using this transparent analogy, Giełżyński differentiates between those he believes Solidarity 
can claim as its predecessors, and those not acting in the nation’s best interest. The comparison 
between Jacek Kuroń, a leader in the opposition to the Communist PZPR, and Ignacy Potocki, a 
leader in the opposition to King August, is particular interesting. Through this comparison, 
Solidarity is effectively adopting Potocki’s narrative - one of advocating for reform and dissent 
                                               
32 Wojciech Giełżyński, “Wiwat Konstytucja! Niech nas uczy nadal,” Tygodnik Solidarność (Warsaw, 
Poland), May 3-10, 1991. Hereafter abbreviated “Wiwat Konstytucja!” 
33 Giełżyński, “Wiwat Konstytucja!” 
against the status quo. This is essentially the Polish tradition Giełżyński, and by extent, 
Solidarity, is pulling from.  
 Furthermore, Giełżyński calls for an extremely strict adherence to the Constitution. He 
argues that, based on the Constitution’s Article I, which promoted religious tolerance, “it is clear 
that some citizens of the city of Przemyśl, who discriminate against Greek Catholics, should be 
publicly stigmatized for violating the May 3rd Constitution, and perhaps brought to 
responsibility.”34 In addition, he also believes that the Prawo o miastach (Free Royal Cities Act), 
which was passed a mere two weeks prior to the Constitution, set a precedent which dictates that 
those “who therefore clamor that we should do despicable acts towards foreign investors, 
because they “will buy up Poland”, are also offending the May 3rd Constitution.”35 Giełżyński’s 
radical assertions, however, are not satirical or ironic. By advocating for a strict interpretation of 
the Constitution, Giełżyński is championing a path that follows in Potocki’s footsteps—a path of 
challenging the status quo that is actively harming the country (intolerance, prejudice, 
nationalism) through aggressive reform. By arguing that the Constitution is setting precedent for 
challenging the existing state of affairs, and drawing direct connections to Solidarity, he is 
effectively adding the document to the movement’s arsenal. The overarching argument is not lost 
on the audience: Solidarity is a progressive movement, and one that will be seen on the right side 
of history 200 years down the line. 
A Centennial Framework 
 Yet another author in Tygodnik Solidarność sees the May 3rd Constitution in terms of the 
celebrations accompanying the date, and more specifically, the potential these events hold for 
Polish society. Jacek Salij’s “3 Maja przed stu laty” (“May 3rd one hundred years ago”) 
                                               
34 Giełżyński, “Wiwat Konstytucja!”. 
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interestingly enough does not specifically focus on the Constitution, but on the recently beatified 
Józef Sebastian Pelczar. Pelczar, who served as a bishop from 1900 to 1924, was still a priest in 
1891 - the centennial of the May 3rd Constitution. He was a strong advocate for helping those at 
the bottom of society, namely the impoverished peasants. Salij sees Pelczar’s work as a response 
to the growing belief at the time that:  
The vows of Jan Kazimierz from 1656 still remain unfulfilled. Because the first, though 
cautious, but real attempt to complete them was the Constitution of May 3, it is not 
surprising that for many years afterwards, the successive anniversaries of its adoption 
were an opportunity to proclaim the thesis that the condition for regaining Poland’s 
independence is the social liberation of the countryside and in general, giving justice to 
all the underprivileged strata.36 
 
The vows mentioned are referring to the Śluby lwowskie (Lwów Oath) through which, in the 
wake of Swedish invasion in 1655-56, colloquially referred to as the Potop (Deluge), King John 
II Casimir swore to improve the peasant’s conditions in hopes that the peasantry will rise up 
against the invasion. 
 Salij’s article, therefore, gives a modern reader a glimpse of how the May 3rd Constitution 
was interpreted in 1891. In the nineteenth century, the understanding was that the Constitution 
represents a promise to help those in need and empower Poles from all walks of life, so that 
Poland in turn could rise up against its foreign invaders. This is why Pelczar dedicated his life to 
raising those most oppressed in the formerly Polish lands. Salij sees this behavior as not only 
exemplary, but relevant to how Poles should interpret the Constitution one hundred years later, 
“...The figure of the new blessed could inspire us to revive this social spirit, which in the last half 
century has almost been murdered, and which was truly present in the past. There are so many 
different social needs that should be satisfied, and so many tasks that are waiting to be fulfilled, 
                                               
36Jacek Salij, “3 Maja przed stu laty,” Tygodnik Solidarność (Warsaw, Poland), May 3-10, 1991. Hereafter 
abbreviated “3 Maja”. 
 
that society cannot only rely exclusively on official structures.”37 Salij is effectively arguing that 
the Constitution represents a spirit of camaraderie and social work, embodied by Pelczar’s own 
work. 
 This is a slight variation on Geremek’s interpretation of the Constitution; but whereas 
Geremek sees the document reflecting the Polish tradition of collaborating to overcome 
hardships imposed on the nation, Salij sees the Polish tradition as one that places helping others 
for the benefit of the nation above all else. Furthermore, he sees this in a very Catholic context. 
By imploring Poles to succeed Pelczar’s legacy, he is effectually implying that they should work 
closely with the Church (which in this context is not an “official structure”) to continue what he 
considers to be the Polish tradition. 
Polityka 
 Polityka is a left-wing weekly, which began publication in 1957. It was originally the 
press organ of the Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza (PZPR - Polish United Workers’ 
Party), which was the ruling Communist party in the PRL. It is one of Poland’s most renowned 
publications and tends to attract a more intellectual and leftist audience. After the fall of 
Communism, the newspaper continued to play an influential role in Polish society and press 
scene; in 1990, it established its own independent publication cooperative after leaving the state-
owned publisher - a unique phenomenon in Polish press.38 Interestingly, while Polityka covers a 
gamut of issues ranging from social to political, its coverage of the bicentennial of the 
Constitution was surprisingly limited to three articles.  
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Separation of Church and State? 
 One of the three articles regarding May 3rd is neither a commentary on the Constitution 
nor a critique, but an exposé of sorts of the prominent members of the Great Sejm. In his article, 
acclaimed author Jerzy Siewierski details the existence of Free Masons within the Great Sejm 
and explains the connections between the organization and the Constitution. Siewierski does not 
treat his account as a sensational one or pose the existence of Freemasons in the upper echelons 
of society as a uniquely Polish phenomenon. Instead, he is attempting to shed light on a 
relatively unknown and inflammatory fact, stating that “It seems honest to commemorate the 
200th anniversary of the May Constitution by reminding that its creators wore ceremonial 
masonic robes and were simply zealously fulfilling the instructions of their laws, which 
proclaimed that ‘Loving your Homeland is by nature a feeling rather than a duty…’.”39 
Siewierski is essentially arguing that these Freemasons loved, and more importantly, contributed 
to, the Polish nation just as much as the non-Masonic members of the Sejm and inteligencja 
(intellectuals). This claim is especially important when considering the fact that, according to 
Siewierski, “among the 177 deputies elected in 1788 to the Sejm, which was later named the 
Great, 38 were Masons ... or over 20% the composition of the parliament!”40. Clearly, this was 
not a negligible number of parliamentary deputies, especially when considering that the primary 
authors of the Constitution - Ignacy Potocki, king Stanisław August and Father Scipione Piattoli 
- all belonged to this organization as well. The number of Freemasons present in the Great Sejm, 
assured that the organization had a pull in the proceedings, and that their influence shaped the 
Constitution. 
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Like all the previously analyzed articles, Siewierski’s work demonstrates his own 
interpretation of the May 3rd Constitution, and how he believes this shapes Polish tradition and 
history. More specifically, Siewierski is pushing back on a lot of assumptions and convictions 
regarding Polish tradition and identity, especially in relation to the Roman Catholic Church. He 
briefly alludes to this in the opening sentence of his article, stating “The creators of the May Act 
were honored solemnly and universally, leaving aside however, with discreet mumbling, the fact 
that a majority of them were zealous Masons, and therefore participants in a movement which, 
for over two hundred and fifty years, was consistently severely condemned and persecuted by the 
Church.”41 This simple and brief mention of the Church, a powerful and omnipresent force in 
Polish society and politics, frames Siewierski’s argument. Taken to its logical conclusion, his 
argument is that the Constitution, which is seen as a staple of Polish tradition and 
accomplishment, cannot be claimed by the Church - therefore, the Church has no monopoly in 
this sector of Polish life. 
This is one of the more radical interpretations of the Constitution, and possibly one of the 
most controversial. The Polish Roman Catholic Church enjoyed immense popularity in the 
preceding decades, as it was one of the main oppositional forces against the PZPR and allowed 
Poles a framework for organization and protest, which was so crucial just a few years earlier.42 
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tactics that were crucial to Solidarity’s success. And because it was so far-reaching, targeting urban cities 
and rural villages, the Church allowed every (practicing Catholic) Pole an opportunity to join the social 
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Additionally, Pope John Paul II, the first non-Italian pope in over 500 years and a native Pole, 
was instrumental in helping end Communist rule in Poland. Therefore, to claim that the Church 
could not claim May 3rd of 1791, a moment many Poles considered the direct predecessor to the 
Solidarity movement the Church played such an instrumental role in, was to argue that the 
Church has a tendency to appropriate significant moments, reframing them in a way that serves 
its interests. 
 The issue over the Church’s position in the grand scheme of Polish society and politics is 
a very pressing on in 1991. Lech Wałęsa, the contemporary Polish president, was a devout 
Roman Catholic, which worried a substantial segment of the Polish population.43 The concerns 
over allowing the Church broader access to the political and public sphere were already 
addressed by some of the articles previously analyzed (in Gazeta Wyborcza, Kula writes that 
“I’m afraid, I admit, of this pressure of faith and tradition.”44) Even if individuals like Siewierski 
do not see the Church as having as large of a claim to Polish tradition as one would expect, the 
entity still pushed to expand its influence based on the principle of its omnipresence in Polish 
history and culture.  
This discourse is addressed by yet another article in Polityka, “Co w Konstytucji?” 
(“What’s in the Constitution?”). In this extremely short opinion piece, columnist Stanisław 
Podemski admits his concerns over the current relationship between the church and state, as he 
believes that Poland is on the trend towards clericalism. “The happenings of societies and nations 
can differ,” he writes, “and the history of Poland proves this best.”45 In his column, Podemski 
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advocates for a strict separation of state and church, which he believes will benefit both parties. 
The “history of Poland” he is referring to is most likely the multiple foreign invasions Poland 
was subjected to. Although at these points in Polish history the nation was controlled by a 
different entity, Polish society still found a way to flourish and grow. Therefore, according to 
Podemski, if Polish society survived in those extreme cases, the same logic should apply when 
the Polish nation is governing itself. Podemski, like Siewierski, is reluctant to give the Church 
credit for what he believes are secular Polish achievements - the Church can exert its influence in 
someone’s private life, but it should not be considered a major authority in public.   
 Therefore, both of these authors effectively push back against common Polish tradition, 
by assigning the Church a lesser role in the proceedings that led to the May 3rd Constitution. This 
is an important interpretation of the Constitution as it relates to contemporary debates of where 
divisions should be drawn between church and state. It also rewrites the typical Polish narrative. 
Whereas other authors took the Church’s role in Polish history as a given, Siewierski and 
Podemski are recasting it in the narrative, giving it a minimal role at best. This demonstrates a 
broader trend that continues after the fall of Communism - a distancing of many from the 
Church. Moreover, it reveals how personal beliefs and ideologies can shape one’s interpretation 
of the Constitution and what it represents. 
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, the Constitution of May 3rd is a document of many faces - one that is easily 
malleable and amenable to various interpretations. In 1991, the document represented the 
pinnacle of Polish accomplishment and tradition, serving as a reminder of what the Polish nation 
is capable of. By framing the Constitution and the history surrounding it as the culmination of 
Polish praxis, the authors of these articles managed to interpret the document in a way that 
served to project their own beliefs and political agendas regarding Poland’s future onto it. This, 
in turn, allowed them to insinuate that their vision is the one that corresponds most closely to an 
authentic Polish one. This sort of rhetoric was especially crucial in a post-communist context, 
when tensions regarding the fate of Poland were at an all-time high. Each author, therefore, had a 
stake in convincing his readers that they should support his personal vision for the country. In 
some cases, such as Podemski’s, this vision was unambiguously tied to contemporary political 
issues. Others, such as Salij or Geremek, promoted a broader, more grassroots level vision of 
social change. 
 Furthermore, some authors used their platform and their interpretation of the Constitution 
to legitimize their particular movement or ideology, or attack opposing institutions. Giełżyński’s 
rendering of the Great Sejm as predecessors to the Solidarity movement allowed him to situate 
Solidarity in a historical context that gave the movement the most credibility and acclaim, while 
Siewierski’s article allowed him to delegitimize the Church’s claim to the tradition of the May 
3rd Constitution. Meanwhile, as exemplified by the “Koncerty, defilady” article, many chose to 
promulgate their nationalistic rhetoric through appropriating the celebrations of May 3rd. 
Thus, by utilizing the mythos surrounding the Constitution, and by imposing their own 
interpretations onto the document and camouflaging their own ideology into it, these authors 
successfully exploited the May 3rd Constitution to further their views how a post-Communist 
Poland should look like. These actions were viewed as acceptable to the general population 
because the predominant understanding of the Constitution in 1991 was that it represented Polish 
tradition. Because the document and celebrations surrounding it were suppressed for so long due 
to foreign intervention, it became a romanticized paragon of not only Polish tradition, but, in a 
way, Polish freedom. While the document was so controversial in 1791 because it broke away 
from convention, and arguably precipitated the aforementioned foreign intervention, Poles in 
1991 readily identified with what they considered a national symbol. Therefore, the discourse 
regarding the May 3rd Constitution on the eve of its bicentennial was not whether it is a part of a 
Polish tradition, but rather, what that tradition actually was. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
